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Abstract 
Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation 
and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these 
phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and internal conflicts between 
‘cooperators’  and  ‘defectors’.  We  employ  a  game-theoretic  model  of  dynamic  network 
formation where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who 
adopt their strategies and copy their social network. We find that, despite using the same 
mechanism, cooperators promote well-connected highly prosperous networks and defectors 
cause the network to fragment and lose its prosperity; defectors are unable to maintain the 
highly  connected  networks  they  invade.  Once  the  network  is  fragmented  it  can  be 
reconstructed  by  a  new  invasion  of  cooperators,  leading  to  the  cycle  of  formation  and 
fragmentation seen, for example, in bacterial communities and socio-economic networks. 
In this endless struggle between cooperators and defectors we observe that cooperation 
leads to prosperity, but prosperity is associated with instability. Cooperation is prosperous 
when the network has frequent formation and fragmentation. 
1 Introduction 
Networks interpreted as graphs, consisting of nodes linked by edges (Erdős and Rényi, 
1960), are used to model a wide variety of natural and artificial systems (Barabasi and 
Albert, 1999; Boccaletti et al., 2006; Csermely, 2009; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2003; 
Jackson, 2008; Montoya et al., 2006; Newman et al., 2001; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The 
evolution and formation of complex networks has been widely investigated (Boccaletti et 3 
 
al.,  2006;  Dorogovtsev  and  Mendes,  2003),  often  with  the  goal  of  understanding  how 
certain topologies arise as the result of copying interactions (Davidsen et al., 2002; Jackson 
and Rogers, 2007; Kleinberg et al., 1999; Krapivsky and Redner, 2005; Kumar et al., 2000; 
Rozenberg, 1997; Sole et al., 2002; Vazquez et al., 2001). Indeed, imitation is ubiquitous 
and is often crucial in systems where global knowledge is not feasible (Bandura, 1985). 
This  mechanism  can  be  conceptually  divided  into  two  components:  the  imitation  of 
behaviours (strategies) and the imitation of social networks (connections). For instance, in 
networks  where  links  denote  interpersonal  ties,  newcomers  want  to  establish  links  to 
successful  people,  imitate  their  behaviour  and  connect  to  their  friends  (Jackson,  2008; 
Jackson and Rogers, 2007); in financial networks (Bonabeau, 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2009) 
the links are business relationships where newly created institutions emulate the successful 
strategies of other institutions and try to do business with the same partners; (Haldane, 
2009b). At a completely different scale, in bacterial communities and multicellular systems, 
where the links denote physical connections, a successful cell duplicates and its offspring 
inherit  (‘imitate’)  the  strategies  (genomes)  and  the  connections  of  its  parents.  Several 
studies have shown the general relevance of imitation to the outcome of social dilemmas in 
well-mixed and structured populations (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988; Lieberman et al., 
2005; Nowak, 2006b; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 
2006;  Szabó  and  Fáth,  2007)  and  to  the  dynamics  of  complex  systems  and  networks 
(Akerlof  and  Shiller,  2009;  Bonabeau,  2004;  Castellano  et  al.,  2009;  Haldane,  2009b; 
Helbing,  2010;  Sornette,  2003),  but  it  is  an  open  challenge  to  understand  the  role  of 
imitation  in  the  interplay  between  individual  benefits  and  the  overall  prosperity  and 4 
 
stability of a system (Bascompte, 2009; Haldane, 2009b; Haldane and May, 2011; Jackson, 
2008; Schweitzer et al., 2009). 
To address this challenge we employ a game theoretical model of dynamic networks where 
nodes can be cooperators or defectors and newcomers imitate the behaviour (strategies) and 
the social network (connections) of successful role-models.  We show that the recurrent 
collapses and re-formations that characterize certain natural and manmade systems, often 
investigated  in  terms  of  external  perturbations  (Albert  et  al.,  2000;  Billio  et  al.,  2010; 
Haldane, 2009b; Montoya et al., 2006; Paperin et al., 2011; Scheffer et al., 2009), can be 
explained in our model as the consequence of imitation and endogenous conflicts between 
cooperators and defectors.  
Cooperation leads to prosperity, but we observe that prosperity is associated with increased 
connectivity, which in turn makes the network vulnerable to invasion by  defectors and 
network collapse. Thus, the long-term prosperity and stability of the system are negatively 
correlated and we find that cooperation is most productive when the system is unstable. 
2 Methods 
2.1 Model 
We consider a network of N nodes linked by a number of edges which varies over the 
course of the evolution of the system. Each node in the network adopts one of the two 
strategies  of  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  (Hofbauer  and  Sigmund,  1988;  Nowak,  2006a; 
Nowak and Sigmund, 2004): a cooperator pays a cost c to provide a benefit b to all of its 5 
 
neighbours; defectors pay no cost and distribute no benefit. At each step and for each node 
i, Payoffi is calculated as the sum of pair-wise interactions with its neighbours
1. A new node 
(a newcomer) is then added and a randomly chosen existing node is removed from the 
system. 
A  node  is  selected  probabilistically  from  the  population  to  act  as  role-model  for  the 
newcomer. The probability of a node i to be selected as a role-model is proportional to its 
effective payoff EPi = (1+δ)
Payoffi, where δ ≥ 0 specifies a tuneable intensity of selection (the 
exponential function affords the model greater flexibility without losing generality (Aviles, 
1999; Traulsen et al., 2008)). A newcomer copies its role-model’s strategy with probability 
1-u  or  mutates  to  the  alternative  strategy  with  probability  u.  The  newcomer  is  then 
embedded  into  the  network:  it  establishes  a  connection  with  each  of  the  role-model’s 
neighbours (‘copies’ its connections) with probability q and directly with the role-model 
with probability p. Thus, with probability q
k a newcomer connects to all k neighbours of the 
role-model. Hence, the parameter u controls the chance to imitate the strategy of a role-
model, while the parameters p and q explicitly model the ability to imitate the role-model’s 
social network and are referred to as embedding parameters because they control how the 
newcomer is embedded in the network. Notice that the number of nodes is maintained 
constant during the evolutionary process. In this respect, our model works along the lines of 
a Moran process, which describes the evolution of finite resource-limited populations and 
                                                 
1 E.g., if a cooperator node has C cooperator neighbours and D defector neighbours, its 
Payoff is C(b-c)-Dc. A defector node in the same neighbourhood has Payoff = Cb. 6 
 
allow  some  analytical  simplicity  (Moran,  1962;  Nowak,  2006a).  A  diagrammatic 
description of the model is given in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1: Network update mechanism. 
Newcomers imitate the strategy and social network (connections) of successful role-models: (i) A 
role-model is selected based on its effective payoff. (ii) The newcomer connects to the role-model 
with probability p (dashed line), connects to each of its neighbours with probability q (dotted lines) 
and emulates its strategy with probability u. (iii) A randomly selected node and all its connections is 
removed from the network. 
  7 
 
2.2 Simulations 
Computer simulations and visualisations were performed using custom created software 
tools  written  in  Java
2.  Simulation  runs  start  from  a  randomly  connected  network  of  N 
nodes
3 having average connectivity k = 4 and proceed with a sequence of 10
8 steps, as 
described in Section 2.1. All nodes initially adopt the same strategy and long term statistics 
are calculated by taking the average of two runs, one starting with all cooperators, the other 
with all defectors, excluding the first 10
6 steps. At each step the total effective payoff of a 
network is calculated as EPtot = ∑iÎ{1…N} EPi. The probability to choose a node as role 
model  is  then  EPi/EPtot.  Hence,  δ  =  0  produces  a  uniformly  random  choice  of  node, 
independent of payoff, while increasing δ makes it more likely to choose nodes with higher 
payoffs.  We  define  prosperity  as  100×(∑iÎ{1…N}  Payoffi)  /  (N×(N-1)×(b-c)),  i.e.  the  total 
payoff of the network as a percentage of the total payoff of a fully-connected network of 
cooperators. 
Long term cooperation, connectivity, largest component and prosperity are calculated as the 
sum of the number of cooperators, average node degree, number of nodes in the largest 
component and prosperity at each step, respectively, divided by the total number of steps 
considered.  
                                                 
2 An online companion software tool that reproduces our results can be found at 
www.dynamicalnetworks.org  
3 Random networks are generated by making any particular link with probability k/(N-1) 8 
 
3 Results 
 
Fig. 2: Typical simulation run that favours cooperators but features transient invasions of 
defectors. A network of N = 100 nodes is simulated with parameters b/c = 3, p = 0.6, q = 0.85, u = 
0.0001 and δ = 0.01. (A) Fluctuating abundance of cooperators. (B) Transition from all-cooperators 
to all-defectors accompanied by network fragmentation. (C) Transition from all-defectors to all-
cooperators showing the synchronous rise in the size of the largest component. (D-H) Graphical 
depiction of networks during the transitions of (B) and (C): (D) a highly connected network of 
cooperators (blue); (E) defectors (red) invade the network, causing a reduction in connectivity; (F) 
few cooperators remain and the network is becoming sparsely connected; (G) with only defectors 
present the network disintegrates; (H) a single component of cooperators start to reconstruct the 
network. The end result of this construction process is a network which resembles that of (D).  
 
When mutation is rare, we observe transitions between the extreme states consisting of all 
cooperators and all defectors (Fig. 2). Such transitions are typically associated with changes 
of  network  topology.  When  defectors  take  over,  the  network  disintegrates,  while  the 
dominance of cooperators is associated with more connected networks. The network tends 
to contain a large, well-connected component as long as cooperators are prevalent, while 9 
 
the network becomes fragmented into many smaller components when defectors prevail. 
During  a  transition  from  cooperation  to  defection,  the  network  fragments  only  after 
defectors  have  taken  over  (Fig.  3A).  For  a  transition  in  the  opposite  direction,  the 
construction of the network is synchronous with the rise of cooperators (Fig. 3B). We also 
note that the delay between the spreading of defectors and the network fragmentation is an 
increasing function of the embedding parameters, while the time for the network to rebuild 
is a decreasing function of those parameters (Fig. 3). These phenomena are robust for a 
wide range of parameters and initial conditions, as well as when newcomers are drawn 
from  the  existing  population  and  ‘remember’  some  of  their  previous  connections  (see 
Electronic  Supplementary  Information).  Thus,  despite  the  fact  that  cooperators  and 
defectors  are  embedded  and removed  in  an  identical  way, we  observe  that cooperators 
promote  the  formation  of  well-connected  networks  and  defectors  cause  the  network  to 
fragment. 
The  way  newcomers  are  embedded  into  the  network  influences  the  topology  of  the 
network, which in turn affects the ability of cooperators to resist invasion by defectors and 
to reconstruct the network once it has been destroyed.  10 
 
 
Fig. 3: Analysis of transitions at various embedding parameters. Median number of cooperators 
and size of largest component (dark lines) over time, considering all the transitions observed in 
individual runs with various combinations of embedding parameters. Other parameters as Fig. 2. 
The shaded regions represent the 10% (lower bound) and 90% (upper bound) quantiles for the 
corresponding medians. Consult the Electronic Supplementary Information for the results on the 
complete range of the embedding parameters. 
 
In Fig. 4 we show how long term cooperation, network structure (long term connectivity 
and largest component), network stability (number of observed transitions) and long term 
prosperity depend on the embedding parameters, p and q, as well as on the benefit to cost 
ratio,  b/c.  We  observe  that  the  probability  p  to  connect  to  the  role  model  seems  less 
influential as long as it is above a minimum value close to zero. In contrast, the probability 
q to connect to the role model’s neighbours is crucial for determining the evolution of 
cooperation, the network structure, stability and prosperity. 11 
 
 
Fig.  4:  Effects  of  embedding  parameters  and  benefit  to  cost  ratio.  Long  term  cooperators, 
largest  network  component,  connectivity,  prosperity  and  number  of  transitions  in  relation  to 
embedding parameters, for various benefit to cost (b/c) ratios. When b/c = 1 long term prosperity is 
always zero. The black stars in the b/c = 3 column denote the p, q combination used in Fig. 2. Other 
parameters as Fig. 2. 
 
The ability for a node to attract newcomers depends on its connectivity but also on its 
strategy and the strategies of its neighbours. This underlines the co-evolutionary interplay 
between the spreading of cooperators and network dynamics that leads to a complex trade-
off between network stability and long term prosperity. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 for the 
particular  numerical  example  b/c  =  3,  p  =  0.6  and  varying  q.  With  a  population  of 
predominantly  cooperators,  long  term  connectivity  and  largest  component  size  increase 12 
 
with increasing q up to peaks where the long term cooperation is close to 100%. Further 
increasing  q  allows  defectors  to  invade,  leading  to  a  rapid  decline  in  the  long  term 
connectivity and size of the largest component. For q close to 1, even defectors form well-
connected  networks,  but  with  low  prosperity.  In  Fig.  6  we  illustrate  the  topology  of 
networks for a variety of parameters and states of the system. With q = 0.3 the network 
structure (degree and component size distributions) of populations of all-cooperators, all-
defectors  and  mixed  states  are  all  similar;  there  is  very  low  connectivity  in  all  cases. 
However,  for  q  =  0.75  and  q  =  0.9,  all-cooperator  populations  have  a  much  higher 
connectivity than all-defector populations. There are also interesting differences for mixed 
populations. For transitions from all-cooperators to all-defectors, we observe that defectors 
invade a dense network of cooperators. For transitions in the opposite direction, cooperators 
are seen to form independent clusters with no connections to defectors. For q = 0.6 the 
population of cooperators exists in multiple isolated components, making it difficult for 
defectors to spread. Here the frequency of transitions is two orders of magnitude lower than 
for q = 0.3 and q = 0.75. Thus cooperation is stable, but at the price of low connectivity and 
low prosperity. 13 
 
 
Fig. 5: Trade-off between network stability and prosperity. Dependence on q of the long term 
cooperation, connectivity, largest component, prosperity and number of transitions for p = 0.6. 
Other parameters as Fig. 2. (A) Long term cooperators, prosperity and number of transitions seen in 
2 × 10
8 simulation steps. (B) Long term connectivity and largest component plotted against q (solid 
lines).  Shaded  areas  denote  the  ranges  of  connectivity  (yellow)  and  largest  component  (grey) 
between all-cooperators (upper boundary) and all-defectors (lower boundary).  14 
 
 
Fig.  6:  Network  topology  related  to  q.  Typical  networks  with  all-cooperators  (top  row),  all-
defectors (bottom row) and the intermediate networks observed during transitions in both directions 
(middle rows) for q Î {0.3, 0.6, 0.75, 0.9}. Other parameters as in Fig. 2. 
 
The recurrent formation and fragmentation shown in Fig. 2 can be seen as the result of a 
conflict between the process of forming clusters and random deletion. Since at each step the 
node  to be  removed  is  chosen  uniformly  from  the  population (i.e., not  considering  the 
payoff),  the  expected  connectivity  of  the  removed  node  is  equal  to  the  instantaneous 
average  connectivity  of  the  network.  As  a  consequence,  the  change  in  the  long  term 
connectivity is governed by the rate of the growth process relative to the instantaneous 
average  connectivity  of  the  network.  Thus,  for  network  connectivity  to  increase  it  is 
sufficient for newcomers to have higher connectivity than the instantaneous average and 
not necessary for them to have higher connectivity than the role-model or for the role-15 
 
model  to  increase  its  connectivity.  When,  by  virtue  of  the  strategy  mutation  rate  u,  a 
cooperator invades a network of all-defectors, its payoff will be the (equal) lowest in the 
network  and  specifically  lower  than  any  defectors  it  is  connected  to.  If  by  chance  the 
cooperator is chosen as role-model, the newcomer will most likely be a cooperator and, 
assuming sufficiently large p, they will connect and form a pair with higher payoff. Any 
defectors connected to the cooperators will have higher payoff and this explains why in Fig. 
3B we see that invasions by cooperators proceed slowly at first. If the pair of cooperators 
survive  and  attract  new  cooperators,  their  payoff  will  eventually  be  disproportionately 
greater than the remaining defectors. This then initiates a (probabilistic) positive feedback 
cycle which causes the synchronous growth of cooperators and connectivity seen in the 
figures. For p and q not both equal to 1 there is always a non-zero probability that the 
network  will  be  entirely  fragmented  (isolated  nodes).  Thus,  for  the  long  term  average 
number of cooperators to be higher than that of defectors, p must be greater than 0 to allow 
the initial pair of cooperators to form and so have higher payoff than defectors. When, 
conversely, a defector invades a network of cooperators, it will receive a higher payoff than 
a cooperator with the same social network and will simultaneously diminish the payoffs of 
its role-model and its role-model’s neighbours. It therefore becomes increasingly likely that 
a defector will be chosen as a role-model in subsequent steps. The onset of an invasion by 
defectors  is  thus rapid,  as  can  be  seen  in  Fig.  3A. In  the  initial  phase  of the  invasion 
cooperators are not rare, however the relatively fewer defectors will be disproportionately 
likely to be chosen as role-models because of their higher payoff. This is illustrated in Fig. 
S15, where it can be seen that during typical transitions from all-cooperator to all-defector 
networks with q = 0.75 and q = 0.9, defectors have comparable or higher average effective 16 
 
payoff  than  cooperators.  During  this  period  the  number  of  defectors  increases,  but  the 
growth of the connectivity is still affected by the current network connectivity and by the 
number of cooperators. This explains why there is a delay before the typical collapse in 
connectivity associated with defectors and why the length of the delay is correlated with p 
and  q.  As  the  relative  numbers  of  cooperators  thus  declines,  so  too  the  payoff  of  the 
defectors, but now defectors are chosen as role-models by weight of numbers. With zero 
payoff,  the  average  network  connectivity  in  all-defector  networks  is  at  its  minimum 
because the selection of role-models is independent of connectivity. 
  
In the Appendix we provide an analytic theory for the limit of weak selection. We find that 
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio, beyond which  cooperators are favoured over defectors, 
does not depend on the probability p that newcomers connect to the role model, but is an 
increasing function of the probability q that the newcomer connects to the role model’s 
neighbours. This agrees with the intuition  gained from simulations. Equation 42 in the 
appendix gives an exact formula that holds for any mutation rate and any population size. 
For low mutation rate and large population size we find a simple condition for cooperators 
to prevail, b/c > (3 + 3n + n
2) / (2n +n
2), where n = N(1-q) is the structural mutation rate 
(Antal et al., 2009b; Tarnita et al., 2009a), defined as the product of population size and the 
probability of not adding a link between newcomer and a role model’s neighbour. We see 
that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches one for small values of q; here isolated 
nodes and very small components provide a favourable context for cooperation. For high 
values of q the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches infinity, because the resulting highly 17 
 
connected networks do not allow the evolution of cooperation (Lieberman et al., 2005; 
Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Szabó and Fáth, 2007). Thus, the weak selection analysis is able to 
capture  the  dependence  of  the  critical  benefit-to-cost  ratio  on  the  parameter  q  and  its 
independence  of  p,  but  is  not  a  complete  description  of  the  complex  evolutionary 
phenomena observed in the simulations (Nowak et al., 2010a; Traulsen et al., 2010). 
 
4 Discussion 
Our  results  show  that  imitation  and  varying  connectivity  constitute  a  powerful  general 
mechanism for the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006b; Nowak et al., 2010b). We note 
that this is achieved without the ability of nodes to adjust their strategies or connections 
(Poncela et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2006), as considered in co-evolutionary networks (Gross 
and Sayama, 2009; Hanaki et al., 2007; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010). As shown in Fig. 4, 
already for b/c = 1.1 we find a large p, q-region where the long term cooperation is greater 
than  75%.  For  b/c  =  1.5  there  is  an  even  larger  p,  q-region  which  gives  a  long  term 
cooperation higher than 90%. Cooperators are less abundant than defectors only for very 
low values of p or for very high values of q. If the probability p to connect to the role model 
is  very  small,  individual  cooperators  are  unlikely  to  predominate  or  form  connected 
components.  
If the probability q to connect to the role model’s neighbours is very large, then the network 
typically consists of a single highly connected component which behaves like a well-mixed 
population. In this case defectors dominate.  18 
 
An intuitive explanation of the described behaviour is that for low q values, cooperators 
dominate the population, but the network is fragmented; the isolated cooperators do not 
interact  and  thus  generate  low  payoff.  The  prosperity  of  the  network  increases  as  q 
increases, but  if  q  is  too  large the  network  becomes highly connected  and cooperators 
cannot  fend  off  invasion  by  defectors.  Thus,  there  is  an  intermediate  value  of  q  that 
maximizes the long term prosperity. Interestingly, as can be observed in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, 
the  zone of  maximum  long  term  prosperity  is  close to  the  q  value  that  maximizes  the 
number of transitions between the all-cooperator and all-defector states. In this area of high 
prosperity the simulations show periods of well-connected networks of cooperators that are 
frequently interrupted by short-lived transitions to all-defectors (as in Fig. 2). Thus in our 
model the population is most productive when it is unstable; the long term prosperity is 
maximized when the frequency of transitions is near its peak. Prosperity increases as more 
connections  between  cooperators  arise,  however  as  the  network  becomes  more  highly 
connected it begins to resemble a well-mixed population where defectors can take over 
(Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Szabó and Fáth, 2007). The proliferation of 
defectors subsequently fragments the network (Fig. 2E-G, 3A), which can then be rapidly 
rebuilt by a new invasion of cooperators (Fig. 2H, 3B). We note that oscillations between 
cooperators and defectors have also been observed in other approaches and are a recurrent 
theme in the evolution of cooperation (Hauert et al., 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 1989; 
Wakano et al., 2009). 
Our results show that, for dynamic networks, the long term connectivity alone is not an 
adequate indication of both the level of cooperation and the level of prosperity. This is 19 
 
illustrated in Fig. 4, where it is clear that the average number of cooperators does not follow 
the trend of connectivity. Moreover, the curve of connectivity shown in Fig. 5B is not 
monotonic: a single value of connectivity may correspond to three different combinations 
of  cooperation  and  prosperity.  This  highlights  the  fact  that  the  way  a  network  is 
transformed  can  strongly  affect  the  spreading  of  cooperation,  obtaining,  in  a  different 
framework, a result that has been shown for growing networks in (Poncela and et al., 2009). 
It would be possible to make  a quantitative comparison with results obtained on static 
networks having the same average degree distribution and population ratio as our dynamic 
networks,  however  such  average  networks  do  not  generally  correspond  to  the  typical 
networks seen during simulations, as illustrated in Fig. 2, and such a comparison would be 
inconclusive.  
 
These results suggest that formation and fragmentation of complex structures (Albert et al., 
2000; Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Levin, 2000; Paperin et al., 2011) are correlated and may 
be a consequence of imitation and internal conflicts between cooperators and defectors; 
here, the same mechanism that leads to the emergence of a complex network can ultimately 
cause  its  fragmentation  and  allows  its  subsequent  reformation.  The  presented  model  is 
clearly an abstraction of reality, however we note that there are examples of real systems 
where the collapse and reformation of the network can be plausibly explained by conflicts 
between  cooperators  and  defectors.  For  instance,  in  bacterial  communities,  which  have 
been considered as networks in (Davies et al., 1998), cooperating cells of Pseudomonas 
fluorescens build biofilms, but mutant cells (defectors) that do not produce the necessary 20 
 
adhesive  factors  are  able  to  spread,  leading  to  the  fragmentation  of  the  structure.  The 
biofilm can then be reformed, under suitable environmental conditions, by the remaining 
cooperators (Rainey and Rainey, 2003), potentially leading to a cycle of formation and 
fragmentation.  Similar  phenomena  are  observed  in  the  fruiting  bodies  formed  under 
starvation conditions by cooperative cells of Myxococcus Xanthus: defectors invade the 
population, leading to disruption of the fruiting body structure and possible reconstruction 
by the cooperative survivors (Travisano and Velicer, 2004). It is also tempting to draw 
parallels  between  our  results  and  recent  financial  crises.  These  crises  (Haldane,  2009a; 
Haldane and May, 2011; May et al., 2008) have been preceded by a great increase of the 
financial network connectivity and followed by network fragmentation (Billio et al., 2010; 
Haldane  and  May,  2011).  The  role  of  imitation  and  the  presence  of  cooperative  and 
‘greedy’ financial institutions have been subjects of the debate on the causes of these crises 
(Haldane, 2009a).  
We have constructed a game theoretic model of dynamic networks able to capture the co-
evolutionary interplay between the spreading of cooperators, defectors and the formation 
and fragmentation of networks. Nodes can be cooperators or defectors and are subject to 
simple evolutionary criteria: newcomers copy the strategies and connections of successful 
role-models and old nodes are randomly removed. We have performed simulations and 
analyses of our model which indicate that it constitutes an effective mechanism for the 
evolution  of  cooperation.  Moreover,  our  simulations  suggest  that  endogenous  conflicts 
between cooperators and defectors can cause the periodic formation and fragmentation of 
complex structures observed in a range of real-world systems. In this light, the prosperity 21 
 
and instability of such complex networks are negatively correlated. While we are aware that 
there exist many alternatives and potential extensions to our model, we feel that it already 
captures some of the fundamental mechanisms at work in reality. We believe our findings 
demonstrate  the  role  and  the  perils  of  imitation  in  the  presence  of  conflicts  between 
cooperators and defectors, suggesting a general trade-off between individual benefit, global 
welfare and stability in complex networks (Bascompte, 2009; Jackson, 2008; May et al., 
2008; Schweitzer et al., 2009; Stiglitz, 2010). 
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Appendix A. 
Analytical solution for the limit of weak selection 
Here we give a complete analytic description of our model for the case of weak selection, δ 
® 0. 
A.1 Model description 
We briefly recall here the description of our model. We consider a population of fixed size, 
N, on a dynamic  graph. There are two types of individuals, cooperators and defectors. 
Cooperators pay a cost, c, for each neighbour to receive a benefit b. Defectors pay no cost 
and provide no benefits. If, for example, a cooperator is connected to k individuals of whom 
j are cooperators, then its payoff = jb - kc. We use an exponential fitness function. The 
effective  payoff  of  an  individual  is  (1+δ)
payoff,  where  δ  is  a  parameter  that  scales  the 
intensity of selection. 
At any one time step a new individual enters the population and another - randomly chosen 
- individual exits. This can be done in two ways and we will analyze both. One option is 
that first someone exits at random and then the newcomer enters; we call this Death-Birth 
(DB) updating. The other option is that first the newcomer enters and afterwards someone 
exits; we call this Birth-Death (BD) updating. In the limit of large population size these two 
processes have the same behavior; however, for small N there are differences between the 
two processes. For completeness we will do the calculation for both, for exact N. 23 
 
The newcomer is chosen independently from the individual who exits. Thus interactions on 
our structure are local, but reproduction is global. We will call this global updating. 
The  newcomer  picks  one  of  the  existing  individuals  as  a  role  model.  This  choice  is 
proportional to the effective payoff. With probability p the newcomer establishes a link to 
his role model. With probability q the newcomer inherits any one link of the role model. 
Thus if the role model has k links, then the newcomer inherits all of them with probability 
q
k. 
Strategy mutation occurs at rate u. With probability 1 - u the newcomer adopts the strategy 
of the role model, but with probability u he adopts the other strategy. 
A.2 Model analysis 
We are studying a Markov process over a state space described as follows. A state S is 
given by a binary strategy vector S = (S1,…, Sn) and a binary connection matrix V = [vij]:si 
is the strategy of individual i and it is 1 if i is a cooperator and 0 otherwise; vij is 1 if i and j 
are connected and 0 otherwise. 
Let x be the frequency of cooperators. We say that on average cooperators are favored over 
defectors if  
    (1) 
where 〈×〉 denotes the average taken over the stationary distribution of the Markov process. 
We will now consider how the frequency of cooperators can change from a state to another. 
There is a change due to selection Dx
sel and a change due to mutation which on average 24 
 
balance each other. Thus, on average, the total change in the frequency of cooperators is 
〈Dx
tot〉 = 0. Tarnita et al (2009a), Antal et al (2009a; 2009b) have shown that for global 
updating,  the condition  (1)  that  cooperators  are  favored  over  defectors  is equivalent  to 
asking that the average change due to selection in the frequency of cooperators is positive. 
In other words, cooperation wins if on average selection favors it:  
    (2) 
We can explicitly write the average over the stationary distribution as  
    (3) 
Here   is the change due to selection in state S and pS is the probability that the system 
is in state S. Since we are interested in the results obtained in the weak selection limit, δ ® 
0, we only need to work with the constant and first-order terms in δ of the expression (2). 
The constant term is the average change in the frequency of cooperators at neutrality, which 
is zero. Using our assumption that the transition probabilities are analytic at δ = 0 we can 
conclude as in Tarnita et al (2009b) that the probabilities pS and the change due to selection 
in each state Dxs are also analytic at δ = 0. Hence we can write the first order Taylor 
expansion of the average change due to selection at δ = 0:  
    (4) 
In  particular,  since  we  are  only  dealing  with  global  updating  with  constant  death 
(individuals  are  replaced  at  random  with  probability  1/  N),  the  change  in  frequency  at 25 
 
neutrality in each state is zero. Thus the second term in (4) is zero and hence, in the limit of 
weak selection, condition (2) becomes  
    (5) 
Here  :=  denotes  notation;  〈×〉0  denotes  the  average  over  the  stationary  distribution  at 
neutrality, δ = 0. It is weighted by the probability pS (δ = 0) that the system is in state   at 
neutrality. In other words, in the limit of weak selection, the condition that the average 
change due to selection is greater than zero is equivalent to the condition that the neutral 
average of the first derivative with respect to   of the change due to selection is greater than 
zero. 
Next we can explicitly write the expected change due to selection in a certain state as  
    (6) 
where wi is the expected number of offspring of individual i. We are dealing with a Moran 
process with global updating and hence we can write  
    (7) 
This is because each individual survives with probability 1 – 1/N and  gives birth with 
probability proportional to his payoff. In our model, the effective payoff is given by the 
exponential  function  (1+δ)
payoff;  however,  in  the  limit  of  weak  selection,  this  becomes 
1+δpayoff and hence we can write the effective payoff of individual i as  26 
 
    (8) 
Here and throughout we assume that there are no self-interactions. 
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6) and taking the limit of weak selection we obtain  
    (9) 
 
Using (9) into (5) we obtain the condition for cooperators to be favored over defectors to be  
    (10) 
The critical benefit to cost ratio in (10) can be rewritten as follows  
    (11) 
where  
    (12) 
The notation Pr0 means that the probabilities are calculated at neutrality. However, for 
simplicity we will use the notation Pr from now on. To define G and Ḡ we pick three 
individuals i, j, k at random with replacement such that i and j are connected. Given this 27 
 
choice, G is the probability that i and j have the same strategy and Ḡ is the probability that j 
and k have the same strategy. In other words, G is the probability that two individuals that 
are connected also have the same strategy, whereas Ḡ is the probability that two random 
individuals have the same strategy, modified to account for the fact that the structure is 
dynamical. We will proceed to calculate these quantities below. 
A.3 Calculating G and Ḡ  
For  simplicity,  we  want  to  calculate  quantities  where  the  three  individuals  are  chosen 
without replacement. Let us make the following notation  
 
   (13) 
  (14) 
   (15) 
 
Then the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (11) can be expressed in terms of z, g and h as  
    (16) 
In the large N limit we have  
    (17) 28 
 
Here for simplicity we use the same notation, but by z, g and h we mean their large N 
limits. 
Thus,  for  calculating  the  critical  benefit-to-cost  ratio  in  the  limit  of  weak  selection,  it 
suffices to find z,g and h in the neutral case: z is the probability that two distinct randomly 
picked individuals are connected; g is the probability that they are connected and have the 
same strategy. For h we need to pick three distinct individuals at random; then h is the 
probability that the first two are connected and the latter two have the same strategy. 
In general these quantities cannot be written as independent products of the probability of 
being connected times the probability of having the same strategy. However, if we fix the 
time to their most recent common ancestor (MRCA) and we take the limit of large N, these 
quantities become independent (Wakeley, 2008). 
Two  individuals  always  have  a  common  ancestor  if  we  go  back  in  time  far  enough. 
However, we cannot know how far we need to go back. Thus, we have to account for the 
possibility that t takes  values anywhere between 1 and  ¥. Note that t  = 0 is excluded 
because we assume that the two individuals are distinct. Moreover, we know that this time 
is affected neither by the strategies, nor by the set memberships of the two individuals. It is 
solely a consequence of the Moran dynamics. 
A.3.1 Probability of given coalescence time 
In what follows, for simplicity of the exposition we will do the calculation for BD updating 
and, where different, we will specify in footnotes what the corresponding quantities are for 
DB updating. 29 
 
We  first  find  the  probability  that  the  two  individuals  coalesced  in  time  t  =  1.  This 
probability differs between the two processes. Thus, for BD updating
4 we must have that 
one of them is the parent and the other is the offspring; moreover, we have to make sure 
that the parent has not died in the last update step. Hence the probability that they coalesced 
in time t = 1 is 2/N
2 which gives  
                 (18) 
Similarly, we can write the probability that three individuals coalesce such that the first two 
have a MRCA t3 update steps backward and this MRCA and the third individual require t2 
more update steps to coalesce. 
For BD updating
5, this probability is given by 
     (19) 
 
                                                 
4 For DB updating we must have that one of them is the parent and the other is the 
offspring, which happens with probability 2/[N (N – 1)]. Then we can write that  
   
 
5 For DB updating we have  
   
   30 
 
 
Fig.  A1:  There  are  three  possibilities  for  the  ancestry  of  three  individuals:  (a)  i  and  j 
coalesce first and then they coalesce with k; (b) j and k coalesce first and then they coalesce with 
i; (c) i and k coalesce first and then they coalesce with j. Each case happens with probability 1/3. 
 
If we introduce a rescaled time   and consider the continuous-time process in 
the limit of N large we obtain the probability density functions which are identical for both 
DB and BD 
    (20) 
A.3.2 Probability that two individuals have the same strategy at time T = t from the 
MRCA 
Let PS (t) be the probability that two individuals have the same strategy at time T = t from 
the MRCA. At time T = 1 we have PS (1) = 1 – u. In general, the probability that two 
individuals have the same strategy at time T = t is the probability that their ancestors had 
the same strategy in the previous step, at time T = t – 1 plus/minus what is gained/lost by 
mutation if there was a reproductive step in their ancestry lines from time t - 1 to time t. 
That is 
    (21) 31 
 
where  PB2  is  the  probability  that  a  birth  event  happened  in  the  ancestry  lines  of  two 
individuals  in  the  previous  update  step.  It  easily  follows  that  the  probability  that  two 
individuals have the same strategy at time T = t from the MRCA is 
    (22) 
For BD updating
6 it is easy to see that PB2 = 2 (N – 1) / (N
2 – 2). 
For the continuous time process, letting   we obtain the density function 
    (23) 
where m = 2Nu. Note that we are taking the limits of large N and small u at the same time, 
such that m = 2Nu is a well-defined quantity. 
A.3.3 Probability that two individuals are connected at time T = t from the MRCA 
Let PC (t) be the probability that two individuals are connected at time T = t from the 
MRCA. Clearly at time T = 1 we have PC (1) = p. In general, the probability that two 
individuals are connected at time T = t after their MRCA is the same as the probability that 
their ancestors were connected at time T = t – 1 multiplied by the probability that in the 
subsequent update step they stayed connected (either because neither of them was picked 
                                                 
6 For DB updating, the probability PB2 is the probability of picking in the previous update 
step a death-birth pair such that neither of the two dies but one of them gives birth. Thus 
PB2 = 2 (N – 2) / [N (N – 1) – 2] = 2 / (N + 1) for DB updating. The recurrence relation is 
identical. 32 
 
for reproduction or, if either was picked the offspring established a connection). Thus, we 
have 
    (24) 
where PB2 is as before, the probability that a birth event happened in the ancestry lines of 
two individuals in the previous update step. Thus we find that 
    (25) 
For the continuous time process, letting   we obtain the density function 
    (26) 
where  . As before, this quantity is meaningful as it is taken for the limit of 
large N and large q. 
Note that if at time T = 1 after the MRCA two individuals are not connected, then their 
offspring will not be connected no matter what. However, after T = 1 all that matters is the 
probability q that offspring add links to their parents’ neighbours. 
A.3.4 Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for N large 
As discussed in Wakekey (2008), Antal et al. (2009b) and Tarnita et al. (2009a), in the limit 
of large population size the probability that two individuals are connected and have the 
same  strategy  at  time    after  the  MRCA  is  a  product  of  the  respective  independent 
probabilities. In this case we can write 33 
 
   
    (27) 
where   and  . 
Using (17) we can calculate the critical benefit to cost ratio to be 
    (28) 
This result holds for both DB and BD updating. In the limit of low strategy mutation, the 
benefit-to-cost ratio simplifies to 
    (29)  
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Fig. A2: Critical benefit-to-cost ratio as a function of the effective connection mutation rate 
u u u u = N (1 – q). The effective strategy mutation rate is m = 0, 10 and 100. The origin of the axes is 
(0,1). 
Finally, using the result in Tarnita et al. (2009b) we can calculate the structure coefficient σ 
    (30) 
A.4 Critical benefit-to-cost ratio for exact N 
For  exact  N,  the  probabilities  above  are  not  independent.  Hence,  we  need  to  calculate 
directly the probability that two individuals are connected and have the same strategy at 
time t after the MRCA. Similarly for the other quantities. 
A.4.1 Probability that two individuals are connected 
First we calculate the probability z that two individuals are connected. This follows directly 
from our derivation above, using (24) 
    (31) 35 
 
For BD updating
7 we find 
     (32) 
  
A.4.2 Probability that two individuals are connected and have the same strategy 
Let   be the probability that two individuals are connected and have the same strategy 
at time t after the MRCA. Then  . In general, for two individuals to be 
connected and have the same strategy at time t it is necessary that their ancestors at time t − 
1 were connected but it is not necessary that they had the same strategy. Letting   be 
the probability that two individuals are connected but do not have the same strategy at time 
t we can write  
    (33) 
Solving the recurrences with base cases   and   we obtain 
    (34) 
Here the recurrence is the same for both DB and BD updating; the only difference is in the 
value of   as specified before. To find g we then need to calculate the infinite sum 
                                                 
7 For DB updating we find  
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    (35) 
For BD updating
8 we find : 
    (36) 
     
A.4.3 Probability that first two are connected and latter two have same strategy 
This calculation is along the same lines as above. However, now we need to take into 
account the three coalescent probabilities (as in Figure S4). Each one of them happens with 
probability 1/3. Let   be the probability that given three random individuals, the first 
two are connected and the latter two have the same strategy. Let   be the probability 
that the first two are connected but the latter two do not have the same strategy. Then one 
can write 
    (37) 
                                                 
8 For DB updating we find   
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Here   is the probability that there was a birth event in the ancestry lines of the three 
individuals.  
For BD updating
9 we have  . 
Next we need to write the base case recurrences. These depend on which of the three cases 
in Figure S4 we are in. Thus we have 
•  if we are in case (a), such that individuals i and j coalesced first and then they 
coalesced with k then 
    (38) 
where   is, as before, the probability that two individuals have the same strategy 
at time t after their MRCA. 
•  if we are in case (b), such that individuals j and k coalesced first and then they 
coalesced with i then 
    (39) 
where   is, as before, the probability that two individuals are connected at time t 
after their MRCA. 
                                                 
9 For DB updating we have   38 
 
•  if we are in case (c), such that individuals i and k coalesced first and then they 
coalesced with j then 
    (40) 
where   and   are, as before, the probability that two individuals are 
connected and have the same strategy at time t after their MRCA, respectively that 
they are connected but do not have the same strategy. 
Performing this calculation for BD updating
10 we obtain 
: 
                                                 
 
10 For DB updating we obtain  
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  (41) 
A.4.4 Benefit-to-cost ratio for exact N 
Using formula (16) together with (32), (36) and (41) we obtain the exact critical benefit-to-
cost ratio for BD updating
11 to be   where 
        
(42) 
     
                                                 
11 For DB updating we have  
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A.5 Comparison with neutral simulations 
In this section we use the numerical simulation method developed by  Nathanson et al. 
(2009) to verify the accuracy of our calculations. Tarnita et al. (2009b) show that for any 
structured  population,  under  very  mild  assumptions,  the  weak  selection  condition  for 
strategy cooperators to be favoured over defectors is given by  
    (43) 
For  global updating  with  constant  death  or birth  rates,  Nathanson  et  al  (2009)  find an 
expression for the structure coefficient σ which enables us to perform very fast and accurate 
numerical simulations. For each state of the system, let   be the number of individuals 
using strategy A; the number of individuals using strategy B is  . Furthermore, 
let    denote  the  total  number  of  encounters  that  A  individuals  have  with  other  A 
individuals. Note that every AA pair is counted twice because each A individual in the pair 
has an encounter with another A individual. Let   denote the total number of interactions 
that an A individual has with B individuals. Then the structure coefficient,  , can be written 
as  
    (44) 
This suggests a simple numerical algorithm for calculating this quantity  for our spatial 
process. We simulate the process under neutral drift for many generations. For each state 
we evaluate  ,  , and  . We add up all   products to get the numerator in 41 
 
equation (3), and then we add up all   products to get the denominator. We obtain the 
perfect agreement in Figure A3. 
 
Fig. A3: Comparison of s s s s with numerical simulations for various N, q and u. The analytical 
curves  show  close  agreement  with  the  simulated  data  points.  Each  point  was  generated  by 
averaging statistics taken from two simulation runs of 10
9 steps, ignoring the first 10
7 steps, with 
p = 0.5. The mutation rates used were u = 0.1 for N = 3, u = 0.05 for N = 10, u = 0.01 for N = 20. 
A.6 Prosperity 
In this section we calculate the average wealth of the population for weak selection. Let F 
be the total effective payoff of the population after taking the limit of weak selection. It can 
be written as   where P is the total payoff in the population. What we want to 
maximize is   which is the average prosperity. The total payoff in the 
population in a state S can be written as  
    (45) 
Thus the prosperity becomes  42 
 
    (46) 
Thus what needs to be maximized is the average probability at neutrality that two random 
individuals are connected and the first one is a cooperator. This turns out to be  
    (47) 
Thus, for weak selection, the prosperity of the system increases with  , which is a result we 
observe in the simulations. However, what we  do not find in our calculation for weak 
selection is an optimum intermediate   which maximizes the prosperity. This is because at 
neutrality  this  calculation  does  not  capture  the  clustering  behavior  of  cooperators  as 
opposed  to  the  dispersing  behavior  of  defectors  because  at  neutrality  they  are 
interchangeable labels. As the intensity of selection is increased the probability of being 
connected reflects more and more the clustering effect. Below we give the plot of this 
probability for weak selection. 
 
Fig. A4: Prosperity as a function of u u u u = N (1 – q) for large N and p = 0.2. 43 
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